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Abstract
Mobile devices are becoming part of modern
digital avionics. Mobile devices can be applied to a
range of scenarios, from Electronic Flight Bags to
maintenance platforms, in order to manage and con-
figure flight information, configure avionics networks
or perform maintenance tasks (including offloading
flight logs). It can be argued that recent developments
show an increased use of personal mobile devices
playing an integral part in the digital avionics indus-
try. In this paper, we look into different proposals for
integrating mobile devices with various avionics net-
works – either as part of the Bring Your Own Device
(BYOD) or Corporate Owned Personally Enabled
(COPE) paradigms. Furthermore, we will evaluate
the security and trust challenges presented by these
devices in their respective domains. This analysis
will also include the issues related to communication
between the mobile device and the aircraft network
via either wired or wireless channels. Finally, the
paper puts forward a set of guidelines with regards
to the security and trust issues that might be crucial
when enabling mobile devices to be part of aircraft
networks.
Introduction
In the aviation industry, there is a growing pro-
liferation of mobile devices, including tablets, smart
phones and portable computers. These devices are
increasingly used not only by the passengers but also
by aircraft crew like pilots and maintenance staff. For
example, a pilot can create a flight plan on his or
her personal tablet (Electronic Flight Bag) and then
upload it to the aircraft [1]. In this scenario, either the
aircraft manufacturer or the airline provides the pilot
with the necessary software application to perform
this task [2].
In addition to mobile devices being used by
the on-board aircraft crew, they are also used by
off aircraft maintenance crew for downloading or
uploading necessary data from the aircraft.
Any mobile devices, whether used by on-board
or off-board crew, have to interface with the aircraft,
using either a wired or a wireless interface. These
interfaces present their own unique sets of security
and operational issues.
It is projected that such devices might bring
operational benefits to pilots, on-board crew members
and maintenance crews. At the same time, it is docu-
mented that use of such technologies might increase
automation bias, complacency, aircrew distraction and
potential software errors [3]. In addition to the listed
concerns, these devices potentially create additional
security and reliability issues. Depending upon the
device, there is a potential that a compromised mobile
device might give a malicious entity a route to an
aircraft’s on-board computers — and depending upon
the function of these devices the malicious entity
could cause damage.
Another complication is who owns the mobile
device, and this ownership might restrict what an
aviation organisation (airline, or aircraft manufac-
turer) can enforce. It is challenging to force a user to
follow a particular policy on a device that basically
belongs to them. This is a traditional security problem
regarding users’ limitations in following a policy, and
therefore users are usually considered the weakest
link in a security-related process or framework.
In the context of this paper, we define a mobile
device as an off-the-shelf portable computing device
that can be used by pilots, aircraft crew, or main-
tenance personnel. These devices can display, store,
process and communicate related information – in on-
aircraft systems and off-aircraft systems alike, using
either a wired or wireless medium. Examples of such
devices include smart phones, tablets and potentially
laptop computers.
Figure 1 illustrates mobile devices potentially
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Figure 1. Mobile Device Connectivity with Aircraft
Systems
connected to aircraft systems either by a wired or
wireless connection, while some of the mobile devices
might also have either cellular or Wi-Fi capability to
connect to off-aircraft systems (i.e. airline networks,
aircraft manufacturer networks etc.). It must be noted
that in this paper we will focus solely on mobile
devices and not “installed devices” such as the Class
3 Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) defined in Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory 120-76 [4].
In this paper, we discuss different operational
frameworks for incorporating mobile devices into on-
board digital avionics, how these mobile devices can
interface with the aircraft system(s), what security and
reliability issues each of these schemes might present
and finally how to resolve security issues, along with
examining the technologies that might be used to
safeguard mobile devices.
Corporate Integration Mobile Device
Paradigms
Two major paradigms to either incorporate mo-
bile devices in an organisational computer system
or to integrate mobile devices with an aircraft’s on-
board avionics systems are COPE and BYOD. In this
section, we will discuss COPE and BYOD, along with
wired and wireless interfaces these devices can use
to communicate with avionics systems. Table I pro-
vides a comparison between the different integration
paradigms that a corporate can deploy to bring in
mobile devices. A detailed overview is provided in
the following sections that explain the elements in
the Table I.
Corporate Owned Personally Enabled (COPE)
In this paradigm, a corporate entity, for example
an airline, aircraft manufacturer or any other avionics-
related company, acquires mobile devices and cus-
tomises these devices to suit its security needs [5].
After installing the management software and any
other applications necessary for employees to perform
their jobs, these devices are then given to individual
employees. By acquiring the devices for employees,
the corporation can make sure that only high quality
and secure devices connect to their aircraft system. In
addition to this, the devices allow users (employees)
to also use them as they desire – by enabling them
to download applications they prefer. Furthermore, as
the devices are owned by the corporate entity, they
can easily manage their enrolment as secure devices
to connect and communicate with the aircraft systems.
Furthermore, the IT department of the corpo-
ration can keep a track of its mobile devices. If
required, the IT department can push updates and also
prohibit applications that are deemed dangerous to
the secure functioning of their applications. In this
paradigm, the corporate entity can exercise strong
control over its mobile devices. However, at the
same time, employees might not get the same level
of usability they enjoy on their personal devices.
Furthermore, if the mobile device was acquired off-
the-shelf then the underlying platform and hardware
would still be out of the company’s control. Any
loopholes in the underlying platform and hardware
would require repair and updating by the mobile
device manufacturer. A brief explanation I in the
context of COPE is given below:
• Device Ownership: As discussed before, the
company acquires the devices and configures
them as it desires before issuing them to their
employees. The company has full control and in
turn full responsibility for security in this model.
• Application Control: As the device is under the
full control of the company, the company can
install or delete any application it desires. Fur-
thermore, it can also prohibit certain applications
from being installed on to their devices by their
respective users (i.e. employees).
• Protecting Company Assets: As the IT depart-
ment of the company has full control over the
device, they can lock it down to have maximum
assurance that no breach of data can be carried
out on this device. Furthermore, the IT depart-
ment might also be responsible for repairing the
device, which helps limit potential “break-ins”
carried out during the repair process by a third
Criteria COPE BYOD CYOD
Device Ownership Company (IT Department) Employee (User) Company’s Approved/Preconfigured Devices
Application Control Full (IT Department) Full (User) Partial (IT Department and User)
Protecting Company Assets Full (IT Department) Partial (User) Partial (IT Department and User)
Responsibility for Securing the Device IT Department User Partial (IT Department and User)
Users’ Privacy Issues Significant Limited Limited
Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees Limited Full Limited
Table I. Comparison between COPE, BOYD and CYOD
party.
• Responsibility for Securing the Device: The IT
department of the company is fully responsible
for securing the device. However, user education
regarding best practices for maintaining security
might still be necessary to educate individual
employees.
• Privacy Issues: Employees have no privacy pro-
tection. Any activity conducted using the com-
pany device could potentially be captured by the
IT department – either for operational or security
reasons.
• Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees:
As users’ access to the device would be restricted
and they would not be able to install or delete ap-
plications, the freedom of use would be limited.
However, usability would depend upon how the
company designs its services for its employees.
It must be remembered that the COPE model is
closest to the traditional model, much preferred by
organisations, known as Corporate Owned Business
Only (COBO) [6].
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
In this paradigm, a user acquires a mobile device
of her own. The user can then approach her employer
and request the company application/credentials to
connect her device to the aircraft system [7]. The
mobile device management system of the company,
which can be an airline, aircraft manufacturer or
maintenance contractor, then enrols the given device
in the system. The company can then also issue their
applications to the user and assign any associated
credentials. To some extent the employer can exer-
cise limited control over the users’ device. However,
fundamentally the device belongs to the user and it
is challenging to control a users’ activity on such
devices.
Furthermore, the management of software up-
dates to patch vulnerabilities and any additional se-
curity software on such a device might be the users’
prerogative.
• Device Ownership: Users purchase the device
and they own it.
• Application Control: The employer only has
control of their own application. In contrast, the
user is free to install or delete any applications
they require. The employer would not be able to
monitor what other applications are installed on
the device.
• Protecting Company Assets: Although the IT
department of the employer is responsible for
protecting the company’s digital assets, if some
sensitive data is stored on the device (as part
of the company’s application), it is challenging
to provide assurance that such data might not
be breached – either by the user or a malicious
entity who gains access to the device.
• Responsibility for Securing the Device: The re-
sponsibility for updating the device in a timely
manner and potentially having tools to pro-
tect against malicious intrusions falls under the
purview of individual users (employees). This is
a challenging prospect for the company to ensure
that its employees take due care of their personal
devices. User training and awareness of security
concerns would be critical in this model but it
has its limits.
• Privacy Issues: Employers can only monitor the
user activity that is carried out out using their
applications or during access to their resources
(i.e. company internet and website). Any other
activities carried on the device are not monitored
and thus provide a level of privacy to employees.
• Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees:
The user has full access to the device and she
can use the device in the way she deems right.
As before, usability deals with the ease with
which she can access her company’s resources –
something that is dependent upon the company’s
design.
Choose Your Own Device (CYOD)
Potentially a compromise between the COPE and
CYOD paradigm, this is referred as the CYOD. In
this model, a company defines a list of preselected
and pre-configured devices that are authorised to be
brought into the company’s network. Employees are
then give the choice of buying any one of these
devices and then using them to connect with the com-
pany’s network [8]. As the company has preselected
the device and might have pre-configured it to its
security requirements, it might have more trust in the
device. The company can also exercise some level of
security management of the device, by managing the
patch updates and applications that can be installed.
However, all of this is dependent upon the employee-
employer relationship. A user might agree with the
company managing their own application on her
mobile device but not with them deciding what she
can or cannot use the device for – in this model the
final owner is still the user, because she has paid for
the device.
• Device Ownership: Actual ownership of the de-
vice is with the employee as she has paid for
it. However, the employer might exercise some
privileges on such devices.
• Application Control: Employees can download
applications on to their devices but the employer
might have some security applications installed
on the device that employees cannot delete. The
employee might be given a free hand to install
and delete any applications they want, except the
ones that the employer has installed.
• Protecting Company Assets: The employer has
the lead role in this but employees’ assistance is
necessary. Security is updated and the employer
can push patches to their employee’s device.
Employees have to use the device in a secure
way so they do not become a route to breach the
company’s data.
• Responsibility for Securing the Device: Respon-
sibility for this lies with both the employer and
employee.
• Privacy Issues: Limited privacy issues, more than
BYOD but less then COPE. Company might still
be able to capture the activities of the user but
restrict itself to certain activities related to the
security and reliability of their application.
• Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees:
The user has limited freedom to use the device as
they desire, as long as they do not try to infringe
any company policies. Usability has the same
level as discussed before in COPE and BYOD.
Interfacing with Aircraft Systems
Discussion of the interface is crucial as it defines
the level of control and the way in which access
to the aircraft systems can be designed. There are
two interfacing media; wired or wireless. In a wired
medium, a mobile device connects with the aircraft
system over a wired link using either a docking station
or a physical port connection. Physical access is re-
quired to such connection points, which might restrict
certain attackers. Furthermore, as the communication
medium is wired, gaining access to communication
traffic is challenging (if not impossible) because it
requires, again, physical access to the communication
wires.
In contrast, if the interface is wireless then a
physically restricted adversary might be able to either
try to connect to the aircraft systems or at least be
able to listen to what is being communicated over
the wireless channel. The security requirements of the
wireless and wired interfaces are starkly different for
an adversary who does not need either access to the
mobile device or physical access to the aircraft.
However, for an adversary that compromises
mobile devices, the notion of security in terms of
wired or wireless communication channels has no
implications. What this adversary is restricted to or
by is the on-device security mechanisms that might
prevent a malicious code/entity interfering with a
sensitive process/application related to the avionics
ecosystem.
The objective of the discussion on interfacing
was to get the message across that for a holistic
approach to the security of mobile devices for avion-
ics systems, interface restrictions are an important
issue, with pros and cons for both wireless and wired
options. However, neither of them completely isolates
nor mitigates all potential security concerns.
Evaluation Case Studies
In the previous section, we discussed different
deployment models for mobile device integration with
aircraft systems. In this section, we focus on three
case studies where deployment of mobile devices
might be relevant. In subsequent sections we will
analyse how different deployment models in the con-
text of these case studies influence the security of
mobile devices.
Mobile Device as Electronic Flight Bag
An Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is a manage-
ment device that helps flight crew to perform flight
management-related tasks in an easy and convenient
manner. According to the FAA Advisory Circular
120-76C, an EFB is an electronic display system
intended primarily for cockpit/flight deck and/or cabin
use [2]. In this paper we focus on Class 1 and Class
2 of EFB, as defined in the FAA Advisory [4].
Class 1 and Class 2 EFBs are off-the-shelf mo-
bile devices that have no FAA design, production, or
installation approval, either for the whole device or its
subcomponents. Devices in these two classs can con-
nect to the aircraft system data and the only difference
between them is whether the EFB is mountable or not
[4].
Mobile Devices as Maintenance Tools
Mobile devices could allow a maintenance crew
to offload the flight logs, perform diagnostics and po-
tentially perform aircraft system configuration. Such
devices might be operated either by boarding the
aircraft or from the ground while the aircraft is
stationary. Such devices can either connect directly
with aircraft subsystems like engine management
systems or may be required to be connected via
an aircraft central system or hub to communicate
with any of its subsystems. As noted above, these
devices may have the privilege of making changes
to the aircraft’s operating parameters/configurations,
thus making them a crucial case of mobile devices
that connect with aircraft systems.
Mobile Devices as Operational Tools
These mobile devices are similar to the EFBs
discussed in the previous sections. However, instead
of these devices being operated in the cockpit or flight
deck, the cabin crew manage the inflight entertain-
ment and ambience configuration using these devices.
These mobile devices might potentially replace the
setting (configuration) console in the passenger cabins
that crew members currently use to control the cabin
environment.
Threat Model
In the previous section, we discussed three po-
tential deployments of mobile devices as part of
a digital avionics network. These three deployment
models have their own security and reliability con-
cerns, which maybe unique to each of their deploy-
ment scenarios and applications/data they deal with.
However, in this section we discuss two generic types
of adversary in the context of mobile devices as
defined in this paper. It must be remembered that
this categorisation is made based on the level of
access each adversary has to the mobile device, not
on the basis of individual adversaries’ capabilities to
compromise a given device.
On-Device Adversary
On-device adversaries are malicious users that
can potentially compromise a mobile device. By
doing so, depending upon the depth of compromise,
they can control the execution of any sensitive ap-
plications that connect with the aircraft system and
communication of relevant information. The closer an
adversary can compromise the layer to the hardware
of the mobile device, the more powerful he or she
is – with abilities to interrupt or modify the execu-
tion of and/or data communication from a sensitive
application running on the device.
Hardware Layer
Operating System Layer
Runtime Layer (i.e. Android Implementation over Linux)
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
Application Layer
Figure 2. On-Device Adversary Target Layers
For an on-device adversary, the aim is to compro-
mise any of the layers (semantically) represented in
Figure 2. The lower the layers an adversary manages
to compromise, the stronger the potential to influence
an application and its data. The adversary may have
compromised the device either at the manufacturing
stage, by getting physical access even for a short
while, or remotely, by installing a malicious appli-
cation on the device. Such an adversary might be
physically distant from the compromised device but
potentially still be able to control it.
Off-Device Adversary
Off-device adversaries are malicious users that
have no access to the mobile devices – either physical
or remote. These adversaries try to intercept the com-
munications between a mobile device and the aircraft
system. In the interface section we mentioned that it
is comparatively easy to intercept a wireless channel
compared to a wired channel, but for simplicity we
assume that an off-device adversary has equal access
to all communication media between a mobile device
and the aircraft system.
Unlike the on-device adversary, the off-device
adversary has to be near the geographic location of
the mobile device to effectively intercept its commu-
nication. This adversary does not need to compromise
either the mobile device or the aircraft systems –
they only need to have the ability to intercept the
communications between the mobile device and the
aircraft system.
Evaluation of Mobile Devices as Digital
Avionics Component
In this section, we briefly evaluate the risk each
of the mobile device case studies might face from
the two generic adversaries discussed in the previous
section. In this section we are not evaluating any par-
ticular product that actually deploys mobile devices
in the respective case studies but are considering a
generic high-level analysis of what security risks these
deployments might face.
Mobile Device as Electronic Flight Bag
Mobile devices such as EFBs may have strong
access control and firewalls on the aircraft system
side, which may prevent a non-authorised applica-
tion from connecting and communicating potentially
incorrect data. However, an on-device adversary can
potentially control the execution of the sensitive appli-
cation that is authorised to communicate with the air-
craft system. Any cryptographic mechanism deployed
for either authentication or encryption/signature in the
data communicated from the device to the aircraft
would potentially be vulnerable to an on-device ad-
versary. Therefore, any security mechanism designed
as part of the sensitive mobile application would not
be effective if the adversary has access to the runtime
environment, or worse, access to the hardware. It
should be noted that any mechanism built on the
aircraft side of this would have little to no effect
in preventing an on-board adversary from interfering
with sensitive applications activity.
Theoretically, if off-device adversaries gain ac-
cess to the communications between the mobile de-
vice and aircraft systems, they might be able to
eavesdrop. An active off-device adversary might even
be able to inject some data into this communication;
however, data integrity is not assured in this commu-
nication.
Mobile Devices as Maintenance Tools
Similar to EFBs, mobile devices as maintenance
tools might have few defences against on-board ad-
versaries if any or all countermeasures implemented
by the application developer are based on the ap-
plications. However, it should be noted that other
mechanisms also do not fare well against an advanced
adversary that has the ability to compromise the mo-
bile device. If the aircraft configuration is generated
on a mobile device and then uses secure cryptographic
mechanisms communicated to the aircraft systems,
such an update would not be secure against an on-
device adversary. However, if the mobile device is
just a communication conduit between the back-office
system and the aircraft system and all updates are
secured end-to-end, an on-device adversary would
not be able to modify the end-to-end communication
channel.
In contrast, for the off-device adversary, if the
communication is unencrypted or there is a vulner-
ability in the communication scheme then he or she
might be able to potentially exploit it. However, as
an off-device adversary does not have the capabil-
ity to break the standard cryptographic algorithms,
which means he or she cannot break into encrypted
communication. Thus creating a strong limitation on
what such adversaries can achieve.
Mobile Device as Operational Tool
Unlike the previous two cases, it can be argued
that mobile devices as operational tools pose the
least amount of safety risk to aircraft systems. As
discussed in the previous sections, an operational tool
might deal with the in-flight entertainment and/or
cabin ambience. The maximum an attacker could
achieve would be modifying some parameters in such
systems – if such a provision were allowed in the
system. The on-device adversary, by now recognised
to be the most advanced adversary, can manage to
interrupt execution and potentially can process any
command as desired, whereas the off-board adversary
can mount replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks
and/or denial of service attacks. Of these, replay
attacks may pose the most significant danger as they
could trigger certain cabin conditions, which might
endanger the cabin passengers.
Guidelines for a Secure and Trusted In-
tegration
In the previous sections we discussed two cat-
egories of adversaries, their capabilities and their
risk potential. The question that arises is “How real
is the threat of the on-board adversary?” A valid
question and the potential of it being realised is not
the realm of fantasy. There are examples in which
devices were shipped with built-in Trojans and/or an
advanced adversary compromised devices after being
issued to users [9]. As aircraft safety is paramount
and its reliability is stringently required, we consider
that designing a system that is secure against such
adversaries is the only reasonable option. In this
section, we list some of the security considerations
that should be taken into account when deploying
mobile devices to interface and communicate with
aircraft systems.
Least Privilege Architecture
Each user and mobile device that connects with
the aircraft system should be authenticated. The ac-
cess privilege issued to the user and mobile device
should be atomic. An atomic access is defined as
individual users and devices having their own sets
of separate privileges – unique to each user and
device. The privileges given to a user will only
be those that the device is also permitted to have.
Furthermore, each access privilege should have a clear
and pre-defined time scale; after this time the user
and device should re-authenticate themselves to the
aircraft systems.
Certain aircraft systems should only allow access
when certain environmental conditions are met. For
example, maintenance crew might only be allowed to
access maintenance logs once the aircraft is grounded
and stationary. Furthermore, a reconfiguration of an
aircraft system is only allowed if the aircraft is
grounded and in maintenance phase.
Trusted and Isolated Enrolment
Mobile devices and users have to be enrolled
in the relevant organisation’s privilege system to gain
access to aircraft systems. These organisations can be
airline operators, aircraft maintainers and manufactur-
ers. In all cases, the mobile device and user enrolment
should be closely monitored. There should be a robust
system to vet users and devices (if possible) at this
stage.
Strong Function Classification
Each application issued to a user and a device
should have a restricted code base. Only the appli-
cation code that is necessary to perform the relevant
tasks should be visible. Hiding functionality based on
access privilege is not a preferred solution in this case.
Strong Binding with Aircraft and Operational-
Environment
Each device and user account should be asso-
ciated with an individual aircraft. This is to avoid
potential issues in which user or device credentials
are used to access an aircraft system when the person
is nowhere near the aircraft or not working at the
time of access. The access credentials and privilege
to access an aircraft should be as unique as possible
and as restricted in time and geographical location
as possible. Furthermore, mobile devices (if possible)
should have a strong binding to the aircraft systems.
Hardened Firewall Mechanism
A strong firewall mechanism with an in-depth
packet inspection scheme should be considered for
mobile connectivity with aircraft systems. Further-
more, firewalls should also be able to detect any
covert channels and enforce strong information flow
policies.
Strong Access Control Mechanism
Access control should be implemented on strong
authentication schemes. Both user and device should
be authenticated separately. User authentication is
based on stronger mechanisms like biometrics (widely
available on mobile devices now) and device au-
thentication should be based on two-way challenge-
response protocols.
Strong Secure and Trusted Channels
Any communication between a mobile device
and the aircraft system, whether via a wired or wire-
less interface, should be protected using cryptographic
mechanisms. For this purpose, a secure and trusted
channel protocol should be deployed. In a secure and
trusted channel protocol, not only do the commu-
nicating entities authenticate to each other but also
their internal states are validated as trustworthy. For
validation of the software (and potential hardware)
state of the aircraft application on the mobile device, a
trusted platform architecture could be deployed – this
is discussed in subsequent sections. This will not only
ensure that the communication channel is protected
and devices are authenticated but also that the status
of applications on the devices are also secure (and free
of any malicious alterations). For an in-depth analysis
and security recommendations on how to design a
secure channel for digital avionics systems, please
refer to [10].
Data Integrity, Traceability, and Validation
Any data loaded or off-loaded from an air-
craft should provide strong integrity, traceability and
validation properties. A strong integrity mechanism
provides an assurance that data is not being modified
by any non-authorised entity during its storage and
transit. For integrity mechanisms, cryptographic prim-
itives like hash functions and digital signatures can
be deployed. Data traceability provides a mechanism
in which data can be traced from its creation to
destruction. Such a mechanism is necessary for data
quality and forensics purposes. Data validation is a
mechanism in which certain elements of data are
created in a specific way, or certain errors are left
in the data in a manner that allows a trusted entity
to verify the origin of data. This mechanism can
ascertain whether data presented to the aircraft or data
from an aircraft to the airline/maintenance back office
can be validated as being generated by the entity to
which it is attributed.
Trusted Platform
There are many proposals that promote trusted
platform architectures. In this section we will discuss
three of these:
Trusted Platform Module: The definition of
trust, taken from Merriam Webster’s online dictio-
nary1 is that trust is a “belief that someone or some-
thing is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc."
The TPM specifications are maintained and de-
veloped by an international standards group called the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG)2 Today, TCG not
only publishes the TPM specifications but also the
Mobile Trusted Module (MTM), Trusted Multi-tenant
Infrastructure, and Trusted Network Connect (TNC).
Facing emerging technologies, service architectures,
and computing platforms, TCG is adapting to the
challenges presented by them.
The TPM chip, whose specification is defined
by the Trusted Computing Group [TCG], is known
as the hardware root-of-trust into the trusted comput-
ing ecosystem. Currently it is deployed to laptops,
PCs, and mobiles and is produced by manufacturers
including Infineon, Atmel and Broadcom. At present,
the TPM is available as a tamper-resistant security
chip that is physically bounded to the computer’s
motherboard and controlled by software running on
the system using well-defined commands. The TPM
MOBILE with Trusted Execution Environment has
recently emerged; its origin lies in the TPM v1.2 a
with some enhancements for mobile devices [11] .
The TPM provides:
1) Roots of Trust include hardware/software com-
ponents that are intrinsically trusted to establish
a chain of trust that ensures only trusted soft-
1Website: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trust
2Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the culmination of in-
dustrial efforts that included the Trusted Computing Platform
Association (TCPA), Microsoft’s Palladium, later called Next
Generation Computing Base (NGSCB), and Intel’s LaGrande. All
of them proposed how to ascertain trust in a device’s state in a
distributed environment. These efforts were combined in the TCG
specification that resulted in the proposal of TPM.
ware and hardware can be used (see the Mobile
Trusted Module (MTM) section).
2) The Platform Configuration Register (PCR) in
the most modern TPMs includes 24 registers.
It is used to store the state of system mea-
surements. These measurements are represented
normally by a cryptographic hash computed
from the hash values (SHA-1) of components
(applications) running on the platform. PCRs
cannot be written directly; a process called
extending the PCR can only store data.
3) The RSA keys: There are two types of RSA
keys that TPM generates and which are consid-
ered as root keys (they never leave the TPM):
a) Endorsement Key (EK): This key is used
in its role as a Root of Trust for Reporting.
During the installation of an owner in the
TPM, the manufacturer generates this key
with a public/private key pair built into
the hardware. The public component of
the EK is certified by an appropriate CA,
which assigns the EK to a particular TPM.
Thus, each individual TPM has a unique
platform EK. For the private component of
the EK, the TPM can sign assertions about
the trusted computer’s state. A remote
computer can verify that those assertions
have been signed by a trusted TPM.
b) Storage Root Key (SRK): This key is
used to protect other keys and data via
encryption.
c) Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs): The
AIK is used to identify the platform in
transactions such as platform authentica-
tion and platform attestation. Because of
the uniqueness of the EK, the AIK is used
in remote attestation by a particular appli-
cation. The private key is non-migratable
and protected by the TPM and the public
key is encrypted by a storage root key
(or other key) outside the TPM with the
possibility to be loaded into the TPM. The
security of the public key is bootstrapped
from the TPM’s EK. The AIK is generally
used for several roles: signing/reporting
user data; storage (encrypting data and
other keys); and binding (decrypting data,
used also for remote parties).
Trusted Execution Environment: A Trusted Exe-
cution Environment (TEE) provides the necessary as-
surance that during the execution of an application, no
on-board application can interfere with its execution.
Two of the main proposals for the TEE are ARM
TrustZone and GlobalPlatform TEE – in recent years
these two proposals have been converging but in this
section we have briefly discussed them separately.
The ARM TrustZone also provides the architecture
for a trusted platform specifically for mobile devices.
The underlying concept is the provision of two virtual
processors with hardware-level segregation and access
control [12, 13]. This enables the ARM TrustZone
to define two execution environments described as
Secure world and Normal world. The Secure world
executes the security- and privacy-sensitive compo-
nents of applications and normal execution takes place
in the Normal world. The ARM processor manages
the switch between the two worlds. The ARM Trust-
Zone is implemented as a security extension to the
ARM processors (e.g. ARM1176JZ(F)-S, Cortes-A8,
and Cortex-A9 MPCore) [13], which a developer can
opt to use if required.
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Figure 3. Generic architectural view of ARM
TrustZone
The TEE is GlobalPlatform’s initiative [14–16]
for mobile phones, set-top boxes, utility meters, and
payphones. GlobalPlatform defines a specification for
interoperable secure hardware, which is based on
GlobalPlatform’s experience in the smart card in-
dustry. It does not define any particular hardware,
which can be based on either a typical secure element
or any of the previously discussed tamper-resistant
devices. The rationale for discussing the TEE as one
of the candidate devices is to provide a complete
picture. The underlying ownership of the TEE device
still predominantly resides with the issuing authority,
which is similar to GlobalPlatform’s specification for
the smart card industry [17].
Encrypted Execution: An application is executed
in a manner such that all of the application instruc-
tions on persistent and non-persistent storage are in
encrypted format [18]. The application is executed
on processes that decrypt the application n execution
cycles before the instruction is going to be executed
– n has to be as small as possible to provide efficient
performance. Such a solution considers that an adver-
sary has control over the software and hardware of a
device except for the internal circuitry of a processor,
which is considered to be trusted. This proposal relies
on security and trust in the utmost basic element
of computing – a processor. If we consider that an
adversary has a compromised processor then it is
difficult to hide application execution from it.
Secure and Trusted Supply Chain for Mobile
Applications
Provisioning of the application to users mobile
device should be closely managed and monitored.
Applications that could have the capability to be
connected to an aircraft should only be available
to the mobile device via a restricted supply chain.
This means that such an application should not be
accessible on general-purpose application distribution
channels.
Secure Decommissioning
At the end of the lifecycle of the mobile de-
vice or the presence of an application on such a
device, the application and device should be properly
decommissioned. Recycling should be carried out in
such a manner that all security-related parameters are
completely removed and the device itself is put on
a black list maintained by the airline or maintenance
organisation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we looked into the provisioning
of connecting mobile devices in different operational
capacities with aircraft systems. It can be argued that
mobile devices have the potential to provide benefits;
however, in this paper we investigated the security
implications of such an operational situation.
We have described three different mobile device
integration models – COPE, BYOD, and CYOD. We
have also provided a comparison between these three
models based on security control and responsibilities.
With these integration models an important aspect is
how a device can interface with an aircraft, which is
either via a wired or wireless interface. In this paper,
we have considered three deployed case scenarios
and potential threat models are presented. We have
divided potential adversaries into two categories – on-
board and off-board adversaries. It is apparent that
an on-board adversary has more capacity to cause
harm than an off-board adversary, but this in no way
means that when designing such an integration, we
can ignore the off-board adversary.
We then briefly evaluated the case scenarios
based on the adversary’s capabilities. Based on this
analysis we have presented a minimum set of guide-
lines to be followed when mobile devices are consid-
ered for integration with an aircraft system.
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